Appendix "C"
REPORT ON
OPERATION "ROUND-UP"
2400 AC&W UNIT
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The two AMES 11C convoys used in the operation proved generally satisfactory. However, more time will be required to study siting for future exercises; (see reports on AMES 11C Oshawa, AMES 11C Downsview). The VHF equipment at NRC/ADCC was on a make-shift basis, and made it impossible to take over control of Vampire and Mustang interception when AMES 11C Downsview went off the air. The make-shift equipment for communication within NRC/ADCC room together with the complete lack of all types of plotting equipment tended to create confusion on the part of plotters, tellers and controllers within the ADCC rooms, and hand sets instead of head breast sets had to be used where a man to man relay system around the table was necessary. Thus three persons were used where one person could do the job properly equipped with a head and breast set. Despite the masking of the table from the controllers by the excess personnel, the exercise did give very valuable training to ADCC people.
DETAILED REPORT ON AMES 11C CONVOY - DOWNSVIEW
The convoy at Downsview was manned by 2400 AC&WU Res personnel - F/O TR Jewett Res Officer as OC - F/L A Millage of ADG as Regular Force controller and observer. Communications were not at peak efficiency. The Bell Telephone Company landline to Scarborough operated only 50% of the time. HF communication between Downsview, Scarborough, Hamilton and Oshawa were good at all times. This unit was operational at 0845 hrs on Sunday 4 March, and attempt made to control Vampire and Mustang aircraft in western sector for the exercise. VHF communication from convoy to aircraft good throughout. Mustand aircraft plotted from Downsview to a distance of 68 miles north and west. Shortly after Vampire aircraft were airborne, F/L Millage, Senior Controller, decided to recalibrate time base of PPI to taking 10 to 15 minutes. Prior to recalibration, one plot had been definitely identified as Vampires. After recalibration, no plots were obtained on Vampires. The reason in the writer's opinion that no successful interception was made on Mustangs by Vampires was due to controllers error in (a) not asking and receiving permission of master control at ADCC Scarborough to go off the air and (b) in not notifying both ADCC master control and AMES 11C control at Mount Hope that he was off the air. CHL/GCI radar at master control Scarborough carried track of Vampires and Mustangs throughout most of the afternoon. However, lack of monitoring facilities on VHF at ADCC master control made it impossible for chief controllers to know whether or not Downsview control was actually working aircraft. VHF communications from Downsview control to aircraft broke down during the afternoon of Sunday 4 March, and on several occasions vectors were given by Downsview tower to Vampire aircraft. It is evident from the results that vectors given from Downsview control were not reaching Vampire pilots.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is strongly recommended that a new site for AMES 11C convoy presently in use at Downsview be found, preferably some 5 to 10 miles from this station either north, north-east or north-west. Permanent telephone landline should be laid from site to ADCC at Scarborough. Permanent and proper VHF and HF communication vehicles must be obtained and assigned to this AMES 11C convoy if results are to be obtained. Weekly calibration flights must be run in order to assess the value of the AMES 11C and to train operators and controller.
DETAILED REPORT ON AMES 11C CONVOY - OSHAWA.
This convoy's personnel departed Stn Toronto at 0630 hrs 2 March and proceeded to Scarborough field station. Due to delays, the convoy was unable to start until 0830 hrs. The convoy proceeded to Oshawa airport without any major incident, although the operating efficiency of all trucks was unsatisfactory. The average speed of the convoy was around 15 mph. The vehicles were spotted in position on Oshawa airport, and antenna assembled, and by 1330 hrs unit was operational. APPROXIMATE TIME TO SET UP AND BECOME OPERATIONAL 2 HRS 15 MINS. Following lunch, personnel returned to site and ComOps Vehicle from Trenton under AC1 Binnie had arrived and became fully operational. Shortly after, the ComOps generator became unserviceable through broken oil line, and authority to be repaired by ECPO was given by OC Detachment, F/O HR Haid. By 1430 hrs, Friday 2 March, landline communication to Scarborough ADCC was established. Signal strength were completely unsatisfactory, and continued so throughout the entire operation. Spare diesel generator with AMES 11C convoy was employed for power supply to ComOps vehicle. Diesel developed trouble and was repaired only after several hours work. HF communication then established with ADCC Scarborough and maintained at high standard throughout the entire operation. At 0730 hrs 3 March, AMES 11C Oshawa was on the air, and on receipt of notice of cancellation of flying, practice plots and dummy runs were passed to ADCC Scarborough for practice purposes. AMES 11C convoy at Oshawa was operational at 0645 hrs 4 March. HF communications was very good, but landline communication much worse than on previous day. So much so that it proved useless throughout the entire exercise. At approximately 1000 hrs, aircraft were picked out and plotted out to East-North-East of station where identification was changed from "friendly" to "hostile" and fighters were directed in successful interception under the control of F/O Harris. It was noted at this time that the aircraft, especially "Black Leader", would not acknowledge directions, and possibly this was due to insufficient briefing. Personnel at Oshawa carried out instructions received from ADCC Scarborough until 1430 hrs Sunday 4 March. Equipment was then dismantled and packed. On return trip, truck #7 developed motor trouble necessitating the replacement of fuel pump and cleaning carburettor. The convoy was delayed until 1730 hrs and did not reach base at Scarborough until 2030 hrs. FS Graham, LAC Birosch and AC1 Binnie of the Regular Force are to be highly commended for their efficiency, interest and extreme hard work in this operation. Their technical efficiency and personal relationshps are outstanding. Sgt Dobson of 2400 AC&WU Reserve took over complete responsibility for ME and deserves special mention.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that all vehicles comprising this particular convoy go into the ME garage for immediate servicing. The radar part of the convoy performed excellently, the ME pitifully. It is essential that a proper VHF/HF vehicle by attached to this convoy in order that week-end exercises can be carried out in conjunction with the convoy at Downsview, and thus two calibration flights laid on for AMES 11C at Downsview can be turned to advantage and this particular convoy spotted out in various sectors within a 10 miles radius of Scarborough.
DETAILED REPORT ON ADCC - SCARBOROUGH
GENERAL OPERATIONS
Despite the lack of all types of operating equipment, it is the writer's feeling that the room both operationally and technically performed in a surprisingly successful manner. Information was received and passed promptly. Aircraft tracks worked out and were available to master control and deputy control at all times, so that a complete picture of what was happening in the air was at hand. In regard to the non-completion of interception of Vampires and Mustangs, again it is repeated that this was in a large measure controllers error; one that must be expected at the present stage of training with inadequate material. The Mustangs were being painted throughout their entire flight at Scarborough based on the reports received from Downsview AMES 11C, Oshawa AMES 11C, Mount Hope AMES 11C and GCI/CHL station at Scarborough. Due to lack of monitoring equipment on VHF channels, Scarborough controllers (master and deputy) had no means of knowing whether or not Downsview AMES 11C was talking to aircraft until sudden failure of plots from Downsview was noticed. An unsuccessful attempt was made to contact Vampires from Scarborough ADCC by master controller. By this time, Downsview had returned to the air and control passed back to Downsview AMES 11C.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Immediate action must be taken to complete the operations room at ADCC. As soon as this work is finished, complete plans for the internal communications system will be submitted and requested. VHF control equipment must be set up within ADCC and proper controller training is impossible without this equipment. In order to prevent interference from radar antenna, the transmitting and receiving VHF and HF should be moved to the extreme west end of the building in the space vacated by General Electric. A properly set up communications centre with necessary inter-communications between controller position and message center will do away with any confusion within the operations room itself by having people running around handing out messages or shouting out messages. Not until the physical labour is completed and proper communications set up made internally will any of the personnel, be they plotters, tellers, clerks, Ops B, controller, or liaison officers, within the room be able to do a proper and efficient job. Plans are now being drawn for a tote board, fashioned to fit the needs of the ADCC room. Due to lack of equipment, 2400 AC&WU is not now recruiting any further bodies, and training of all types will be curtailed to the point where any one group will share alternate Sundays with another group. It is now impossible to maintain training on a proper schedule, and will continue to be impossible until the operations room is fully and completely equipped.
Operation "Round-Up" simply pointed up in dramatic fashion discrepancies of which all concerned with training on 2400 AC&WU were aware.