Part I
Summary of Findings.
Forces Available
| Phase I | 410 Sqn | 12 aircraft |
| 439 Sqn | 12 aircraft | |
| 416 Sqn | 8 aircraft | |
| 441 Sqn | 8 aircraft at N Luff | |
| 441 Sqn | 4 aircraft at Coltishall | |
| Phase II | 410 Sqn | 12 aircraft |
| 439 Sqn | 12 aircraft | |
| 416 Sqn | 8 aircraft | |
| 441 Sqn | 12 aircraft at Horsham | |
| Phase III | 410 Sqn | 12 aircraft |
| 439 Sqn | 12 aircraft at Horsham | |
| 416 Sqn | 8 aircraft | |
| 441 Sqn | 12 aircraft at Horsham |
Operations
General
From the point of view of 1 (F) Wing, the operation was most successful with a total of 741 sorties and 107 claims.
The consensus of opinion on the part of participating pilots was that the standard of GCI control was not up to "scratch" and that there was a decided shortage of targets for the amount of flying involved.
The advantages of flying without tanks, particularly against fast flying high targets (over 40,000) outweighs the advantages of increased range and no difficulty was found in catching Canberras flying under 42,000 providing reasonable intercept position was established.
Through lack of mass raid targets no formation larger than four aircraft was used. However, it is well known that the operational efficiency of the Sabre is hampered in larger formations, and preferences is always given to streaming sections of fours into the general target area rather than flying as a compact Wing or Squadron.
Low level operations without drop tanks are considered undesirable and uneconomical because of range limitations. The wing was used very sparingly on convoy patrol and it was felt that no advantage was gained from their use because of the relative short period they could spend on patrol.
Deployment
The deployment of the "Jim Crow" force at Coltishall was no problem but failed to pay dividends.
The deployment of, first 441 Sqn and then 439 Sqn to Horsham again presented no major problem and it was found that squadrons could be ready to move within 2 hours of notification. Of course, no large support equipment had to be moved as all maintenance, other than line servicing, was carried out at the squadron's home base. If longer periods of deployment were necessary then more advance notice would be required.
With the advent of increased GCI range making interceptions possible 100 miles off the coast it would appear expedient to move or establish Sabres closer to the coast for more expedient coverage and range.
Operations Room
The Operations Room operated efficiently but lacks sufficient communications to squadron dispersals. The new 20 line switchboard should alleviate this problem to some extent but it would be most appropriate here to put in a "plug" for the rapid completion of the telescramble programme.
The RCAF does not establish sufficient personnel for the efficient operation of an Operations Room during peace time, however, this would undoubtedly be changed in the event of war. Staffs were supplemented through volunteers from administrative sections on the unit, this method of manning however would not be feasible for extended exercises.
It was felt that Wing Operations Officers should be given more scope in the Readiness State of sections. That is, that, the decisions as to what sections be brought up to standby be rested in Wing Operations Officer since he is in the best possible position to know availability of aircraft and to keep squadrons as even as possible on flying time and cockpit sitting.
Report on Cine Gun Operation
General
This exercise has provided 1 (F) Wing with some valuable training. High speed high altitude targets were numerous and a number of successful interceptions were made. (See below).
Targets - Medium and Low Level
There was little activity at medium and low altitudes with only occasional interceptions on B-29, B-50, Varsities and B-26. Film quality was good and pilots technique showed a vast improvement over last years exercise.
Targets - High Altitude
The great majority of interceptions were on high altitude high speed targets featuring Canberras, F-84s, F-86s, B-45s and B-47s.
Thirty six (36) separate interceptions were made on Canberra targets. Almost all attacks were made line astern from 1800' to 400'. Average altitude 40,000, average speed mach .78 - .82. Fortunately the Canberra has no tail turret. In almost all cases intercepts were made on single targets and no evasive action was taken. Film quality at high altitudes was good and no difficulty was perceived in assessing film.
Nose Cameras
Assessing film taken with the nose camera installation was, of course, impossible, except when attacks were made line astern. The quality of this film was extremely poor and in most cases was unassessable. All aircraft must be equipped with the recorder camera cockpit installation.
Further training on high altitude high speed targets is necessary if line astern attack is to be eliminated.
C Davies F/L